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Abstract
I consider a dynamic model of competition between
two proprietary networks. Consumers die and are re-
placed with a constant hazard rate; and ¯rms compete
for new consumers to join their network by o®ering net-
work entry prices.
I derive a series of results pertaining to: (a) existence
and uniqueness of symmetric equilibria, (b) monotonicity
of the pricing function (e.g., larger networks set higher
prices), (c) network size dynamics (increasing dominance
vs. reversion to the mean), and (d) ¯rm value (how it
varies with network e®ects).
Finally, I apply my general framework to the study
of termination charges in wireless telecommunications. I
consider various forms of regulation and examine their
impact on ¯rm pro¯ts and market share dynamics.
¤Academic Director (U.S.), IESE Business School; lcabral@iese.edu. I am grateful to
Mike Riordan for extensive discussions on matters related to this paper. I also thank
Ennio Stacchetti, Andrea Prat, four referees, and seminar participants at (in chronolog-
ical order) Yale, NYU, Cornell, Cambridge, Oxford, LSE, Ohio State, Nova, Autoridade
da Concorr^ encia, SED Prague meetings, Sidney, Melbourne, New South Wales, ANU,
Queensland, Iowa State, Vanderbilt, Drexel, IESE Business School, Navarra, Munich,
Johns Hopkins, Edinburgh, Imperial College, LBS, Southampton, Toulouse, UAB, War-
wick, East Anglia, Porto, Bologna, and the Econometric Society U.S. meetings for useful
comments. Naturally, I am solely responsible for errors and omissions.1 Introduction
Many industries exhibit some form of network e®ects, the situation whereby
a consumer's valuation is increasing in the number of other consumers buying
the same product (that is, the number of consumers in the same \network").
The most obvious source of network e®ects is direct network e®ects. Take
the example of operating systems. If I use the Windows OS then, when I
travel, it is more likely I will ¯nd a computer that I can use (both in terms of
knowing how to use it and in terms of being able to run ¯les and programs
I carry with me).1
A second source of network e®ects is the availability of complementary
products. For example, it seems reasonable that the variety and quality of
software available for the Palm system is greater the more users buy PDAs
that run Palm OS. A similar argument applies for complementary services.
For example, the greater the number of Canon photocopiers are sold, the
more likely it is that I will be able to ¯nd good post-sale service providers.
Finally, a third source of network e®ects is the pricing of network ser-
vices.2 Take the example of wireless telecommunications. To the extent that
operators set di®erent on-net and o®-net prices, the utility from being con-
nected to a given network is increasing in the number of other users on the
same network.
In this paper, I consider a dynamic model of competition between two
proprietary networks. Consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard
rate. Firms compete for new consumers to join their network by o®ering
network entry prices (which may be below cost). New consumers have a
privately known preference for each network. Upon joining a network, in
each period consumers enjoy a bene¯t which is increasing in network size
during that period. Firms receive revenues from new consumers as well as
from consumers already belonging to their network.
I develop a general model with the above features. I derive the ¯rms'
and the consumers' value functions, both of which are a function of current
network sizes. I provide conditions such that there exists a unique Markov
equilibrium. The key is that, di®erently from static models, in an overlap-
1. Another source of direct network e®ects would be ¯le sharing. While this is fre-
quently proposed as the main source of direct network e®ects, in the example at
hand I think it is relatively less important.
2. La®ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) refer to this case as \tari®-mediated network ex-
ternalities."
2ping generations framework consumers e®ectively make their network choices
sequentially.
I then characterize the equilibrium, using a combination of analytical
and numerical methods. One set of results pertains to the pricing function.
As is frequently the case with dynamic games, there are two e®ects to con-
sider. Larger networks are more attractive to consumers. This implies that,
ignoring the ¯rms' future payo®s, larger networks should set higher prices.
However, in terms of future payo®s, larger ¯rms have more to gain from in-
creasing their network size then smaller ¯rms. This dynamic version of the
\e±ciency e®ect" (duopoly joint pro¯ts are greater the greater the asymme-
try between ¯rms) leads larger ¯rms to price lower. I provide conditions such
that each of these e®ects dominates.
Although the equilibrium is symmetric, both the birth and the death
processes are stochastic. Consequently, the actual state of the system (each
¯rm's network size) is generally asymmetric. I show that a larger network is
generally more likely to attract a new consumer (weak market dominance).
Moreover, if network e®ects are su±ciently strong, then the larger network
tends to increase in size (strong market dominance), unless it holds close to
100% of the market, in which case it tends to decrease in size. As a result,
when network e®ects are su±ciently strong the stationary distribution of
market shares is typically bimodal | the system spends most of the time
at states where the large network has a market share between 50 and 100
percent.
Finally, I apply my general framework to the study of termination charges
in wireless telecommunications. I consider three stylized forms of regulation:
(a) termination charges set at marginal cost level, (b) symmetric termination
charges higher than marginal cost, and (c) asymmetric termination charges
(higher for smaller networks). I derive both the short-run and the long-run
e®ects of these di®erent regimes.
Related literature. Following seminal work by Katz and Shapiro
(1985), the early literature on oligopoly with network e®ects focused on rel-
atively simple, static models.3 Since then, the industrial organization litera-
ture developed in two directions. One strand attempts to empirically measure
3. Other important early work includes Farrell and Saloner (1985), who focus on
consumer behavior, and Arthur (1989), who presents an in¯nite period model but
assumes non-proprietary networks (and thus excludes strategic behavior).
3the size of network e®ects.4 Another strand investigates further implications
of network e®ects in an oligopoly context.5 Despite important developments,
most of this literature has followed a static, or ¯nite period, approach.6
More recent work attempts to explicitly address the issue of dynamic
competition between proprietary networks. Doganoglu (2003), Mitchell and
Skrzypacz (2006), derive the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of an in¯nite pe-
riod game where consumer's utility is an increasing function of past market
shares. Markovich (2004), Markovich and Moenius (2004) develop compu-
tational models of industries with \hardware" and \software" components
(very much like my paper). They assume consumers live for two periods and
bene¯t from indirect network e®ects through the quality of products avail-
able. Doraszelski, Chen, and Harrington (2007) also develop a computational
dynamic model. In many respects, their analysis goes beyond my paper: for
example, they analyze compatibility decisions, which I don't. However, like
Doganoglu (2003), Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2006), they assume consumer
bene¯ts are an increasing function of network size at the time of purchase
(that is, consumers are not forward looking). In sum, all of these papers as-
sume relatively simple behavior on the part of consumers: either consumers
are short-lived, or they are myopic, or they are backward looking.7 By con-
trast, I assume that consumers live for potentially many periods (that is, die
with a constant hazard rate), and make their decisions in a rational, forward
looking way. My paper also di®ers from theirs in that I look at a di®erent
set of issues.
In this sense, the papers that come closest to mine are Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000), Driskill (2007), Laussel and Resende (2007), and Zhu and Ian-
siti (2007), all of which consider forward looking consumers. The framework
considered by Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) is very speci¯c: two consumers,
two consumer types, etc.; the number and type of questions that can be
addressed with such a simple model is therefore limited. Fudenberg and Ti-
role (2000) show that, under certain conditions, there exists an equilibrium
whereby an incumbent ¯rm sets a lower price in the presence of network
externalities with a view at preempting competition by a potential entrant.
4. See, for example, Gandal (1994), Goolsbee and Klenow (2002), Rysman (2004).
5. See, for example, La®ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b).
6. Farrell and Klemperer (2006) present an excellent survey of this literature. See also
Economides (1996).
7. See also Kandori and Rob (1998), Auriol and Benaim (2000), who approach the
problem from a stochastic evolutionary perspective.
4The issue of network e®ects and pricing is also present in Driskill (2007).
He considers a deterministic, continuous-time model where consumers are
forward looking. He shows, among other things, that steady-state prices are
lower in the presence of network externalities. My framework di®ers from his
in that I consider idiosyncratic consumer preferences, which generate stochas-
tic dynamics: I show that prices may be higher or lower in the presence of
network e®ects; I also explain the main forces leading to di®erent price levels.
Laussel and Resende (2007) look at equilibria in linear Markov strategies.
They show that, in equilibrium, network access prices are decreasing in ¯rm
size. I provide su±cient conditions such that this is the case; but I also
provide su±cient conditions such that the opposite is true. Moreover, in my
model equilibrium strategies are generally nonlinear.
Zhu and Iansiti (2007) look at the competition between an incumbent
and an entrant platform. In some respects, their model is more complex
than mine: for example, they explicitly consider investment decisions by
developers of each platform (network). In other respects, their framework is
simpler than mine: for example, they assume prices are ¯xed and exogenouly
given. They make several interesting points. In particular, they show that,
contrary to popular wisdom, indirect network e®ects may favor the entrant
platform (see also Llobet and Manove, 2006). In my paper, networks e®ects
tend to hurt the small ¯rm. The di®erence with respect to Zhu and Iansiti
(2007) is partly due to the fact that I do not consider investments in quality.
Following the seminal contributions by Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and
Reinganum (1982), a series of papers have addressed the issue of persistence
of ¯rm dominance. Contributions to this literature include Budd, Harris and
Vickers (1993), Cabral and Riordan (1994), Athey and Schmutzler (2001),
Cabral (2002). These papers provide conditions under which larger ¯rms
tend to become larger (market dominance). Intuitively, the reason for such
dynamics corresponds to some form of the \e±ciency e®ect" characterized
by Gilbert and Newbery (1982): the fact that joint pro¯ts are greater the
closer the market structure is to monpoly. My framework and results are
consistent with the idea of market dominance. Speci¯cally, I show that, if
network e®ects are su±ciently strong and the large ¯rm is not too large, then
market dominance holds.
From a methodological point of view, my framework has various similar-
ities with Cabral and Riordan's (1994) study of dynamic competition with
learning curves. In many respects, one can interpret learning curves as a
\sequential network e®ect." In fact, some of Cabral and Riordan's (1994)
5results regarding market dynamics hold in the context of network e®ects:
in particular, the idea that larger ¯rms tend to become even larger. How-
ever, there are two important di®erences between my framework and Cabral
and Riordan (1994). First, Cabral and Riordan (1994) assume that learning
curves \bottom out" at some level of learning (and there is no forgetting).
This implies that the model can be solved backwards, starting with the state
at which both ¯rms reached the bottom of their learning curves. This in turn
greatly simpli¯es the problem of ¯nding a unique equilibrium. My current
framework, by contrast, has consumers dying and being born. There is no
absorbing state, rather ¯rm size follows an ergodic Markov chain. This is
more realistic in the context of network e®ects, but it also makes the analy-
sis more complicated. Second, and more important, in Cabral and Riordan
(1994) consumers play a passive role: they simply pick the best value for the
money in each period. By contract, under network e®ects, I need to explicitly
model consumer expectations regarding the evolution of network sizes.
Structure of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, I lay down the basic analytical framework, including
the consumer and the ¯rm optimization problems. Section 3 includes the
main analytical results characterizing equilibrium dynamics, with a special
emphasis on the price function and market share dynamics. In Section 4, I
apply my general framework to a particular problem: access charge regulation
in wireless telecommunications. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
I consider an in¯nite period model of price competition between two propri-
etary networks, owned by ¯rms A and B. Since I analyze anonymous Markov
equilibria, with some abuse of notation I denote each ¯rm by the size of its
network, i or j. Network size evolves over time due to consumer birth and
death. In each period, a consumer dies and a new consumer is born. The
new consumer chooses between one of the existing networks and stays with
6it until death.8;9
Speci¯cally, the timing of moves in each period is summarized in Table 1.
Initially, a total of ´¡1 consumers are distributed between the two ¯rms, so
i + j = ´ ¡ 1. A new consumer is born and ¯rms simultaneously set prices
p(i); p(j) for the consumer to join their network. If the new consumer opts
for network i, then ¯rm i receives a pro¯t p(i), whereas the consumer receives
a one-time bene¯t from joining network i, ³i.10
After the new consumer makes his choice, there are a total of ´ consumers
divided between the two networks. During the remainder of the period, ¯rm
i receives a payo® µ(i), whereas a consumer attached to network i enjoys
a bene¯t ¸(i). In others words, I treat network choice as a durable good,
and assume there is some non-durable good attached to the durable good
\network membership." I denote the market for the non-durable good as the
aftermarket. Finally, at the end of the period one consumer dies, each with
equal probability.11 In other words, a consumer from ¯rm i's network dies
with probability i=´.
Since my main goal is to understand the evolution of network size over
time, I take the values µ(i) and ¸(i) as given, that is, I treat them as the
reduced form of the stage game played in the aftermarket. I assume that
¸(i) and µ(i) are bounded. Some of the results in Section 3 assume further
properties of µ(i) and ¸(i), in particular the following two:
Property 1 (increasing network bene¯ts) ¸(i) is increasing.
8. In this sense, my framework is similar to that of Beggs and Klemperer (1992).
They too consider a stationary number of consumers and assume that a newborn
consumer, having chosen one of the sellers, sticks with it until death.
9. Although I work with a discrete time model, the underlying reality I have in mind
is one of continuous time. Suppose that consumers die according to a Poisson
process with arrival rate ¸. Essentially, I consider the time between two consecutive
deaths as a period in my discrete time model. By assuming risk-neutral agents, I
can summarize the Poisson arrival process in a discount factor ± that re°ects the
average length of a discrete period: ± = exp(¡r=¸), where r is the continuous time
discount rate.
10. For simplicity, I assume zero cost. Alternatively, we can think of p(i) as markup
over marginal cost.
11. The assumption that each consumer dies with equal probability allows me to keep
the state space one-dimensional. In the opposite extreme case when consumers live
a ¯xed number of periods (´, to keep total market size the same), the state space
becomes ´-dimensional.
7Table 1: Timing of model: events occurring in each period t.
Event Value State of the game
functions
Firms set network entry prices p(i) v(i) i 2 f0;:::;´ ¡ 1g
Nature chooses »i, new consumer's
preference for network i
New consumer chooses network u(i) i 2 f0;:::;´g
Stage competition takes place: period
pro¯ts µ(i), consumer surplus ¸(i)
One consumer dies (probability 1
´) i 2 f0;:::;´ ¡ 1g
Property 2 (increasing returns to network size) Both µ(i) and µ(i +
1) ¡ µ(i) are increasing.
Property 1 is straightforward: the greater a network size, the greater
each consumer's aftermarket surplus (weakly). The ¯rst part of Property 2
is also fairly straightforward: larger networks make at least as much money
in the aftermarket as smaller networks. With regards to the second part of
Property 2, note that increasing µ(i) ¯rst di®erences implies that





It thus implies that ¯rms (weakly) enjoy network bene¯ts, in the sense that
aftermarket variable pro¯t per consumer is nondecreasing in network size,
that is, network bene¯ts imply increasing returns to scale for ¯rms.
One can ¯nd many examples that feature increasing network bene¯ts ac-
cording to Properties 1 and 2.12 One can also ¯nd examples where one of
the properties, or both, fail. In Section 4, I consider an application to wire-
less telecommunications networks where the aftermarket corresponds to cell
phone usage. I show that, if termination charges are symmetric (network A
pays network B the same charge that network B pays network A) and greater
than marginal cost, then we have increasing network bene¯ts and increasing
12. Two examples are: after sales service (e.g., photocopiers, printers, cameras); and
handheld operating systems (e.g., Palm, PocketPC).
8returns to network size. If however access charges are very asymmetric, then
Property 1 and Property 2 may fail.
My focus is on the ¯rms' pricing decision and the consumer's network
choice. Speci¯cally, I consider equilibria in Markov pricing and network
choice decisions. The state is de¯ned by i, the size of ¯rm i's network at
the beginning of the period, that is, when ¯rms set prices and the newborn
consumer chooses one of the networks.13 I next derive the consumer's and
the ¯rm's decisions in a Markov equilibrium.
Consumer choice. Each consumer's utility is given by two components:
³i and ¸(i). The ¯rst component is the consumer's idiosyncratic preference
for ¯rm i, which I assume depends on the identity of ¯rm i but not on the size
of its network (thus the use of a subscript rather than an argument). The
value of ³i is also the consumer's private information. The second component
is network bene¯t from a network with size i (including the consumer in
question), which I assume is independent of the ¯rm's identity. I assume
that consumers receive the ³i component the moment they join a network,
whereas ¸(i) is received each period that a consumer is still alive (and thus
varies according to the size of the network during each future period).14
I assume that the values of ³i are su±ciently high so that a newborn
consumer always chooses one of the available networks; that is, the outside
good is always dominated. This is not an innocuous assumption, as I will
discuss in Section 3; but it greatly simpli¯es the analysis. In particular,
it allows me to concentrate on the value of »i ´ ³i ¡ ³j, the consumer's
idiosyncratic relative preference for ¯rm i's network. Notice that »j = ¡»i. I
assume that »i is distributed according to ©(») (density Á(»)), which satis¯es
the following properties:
13. Note that, when consumers enjoy network bene¯ts, there are a total of ´ consumers,
divided across the two networks. However, at the time that prices are set there are
only ´¡1 consumers, so i 2 f0;:::;´¡1g at that moment. The state and the ¯rm
value functions are de¯ned at this moment (beginning of period).
14. The assumption that ³i is received at birth is not important. I could have the con-
sumer receive ³i each period of his or her lifetime. However, this way of accounting
for consumer utility simpli¯es the calculations. The important assumption is that
all consumer heterogeneity is encapsulated in the value of ³i, not in the recurring
network bene¯t ¸(i). Abandoning this assumption would make the state space
extremely large and render the analysis considerably more complex.
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u(i) = ¸(i) + ±
Figure 1: Consumer's value function.
Assumption 1 (i) ©(») is continuously di®erentiable; (ii) Á(») = Á(¡»);
(iii) Á(») > 0; 8»; (iv) ©(»)=Á(») is strictly increasing.
Many common distributions, including the Normal, satisfy Assumption 1.
Let u(i) be a consumer's aftermarket value function, that is, the dis-
counted value of payo® streams ¸(i) received while the consumer is alive
(thus excluding both ³i and the price paid to join the network). Unlike the
¯rm value functions, which I will measure at the beginning of each period,
I will measure u(i) after the current consumer has made his decision. This
means that the argument of u(i) varies from 1 to ´.
Consider a new consumer's decision. At state i, the indi®erent consumer
will have »i = x(i), where the latter is given by
x(i) ¡ p(i) + u(i + 1) = ¡p(j) + u(j + 1); (1)
or simply
x(i) = p(i) ¡ p(j) ¡ u(i + 1) + u(j + 1): (2)
where p(i) is ¯rm i's price. This looks very much like a Hotelling consumer
decision, except for the fact that u(i+1) and u(j+1) are endogenous values.
Firm i's demand is the probability of attracting the new consumer to its
network. It is given by




= 1 ¡ ©
¡
p(i) ¡ p(j) ¡ u(i + 1) + u(j + 1)
¢
: (3)
10The consumer value functions, introduced above, are illustrated in Figure
1. The corresponding formula is given by




















where q(i) is given by (3), i = 1;:::;´, and j = ´ ¡ i.15 In words, a
consumer's value is given, to begin with, by the current aftermarket bene¯t
¸(i). In terms of future value, there are three possibilities: with probability
1=´, the consumer dies, in which case I assume continuation utility is zero.16
With probability (i¡1)=´, a consumer from the same network dies. This loss
is compensated by the newborn consumer joining network i, which happens
with probability q(i¡1), in which case next period's aftermarket state reverts
back to i. With probability 1¡q(i¡1), the new consumer opts for the rival
network, in which case next period's aftermarket state drops to i¡1. Finally,
with probability j=´, a consumer from the rival network dies. This loss is
compensated by the newborn consumer joining network j, which happens
with probability q(j¡1), in which case next period's aftermarket state reverts
back to i. With probability 1 ¡ q(j ¡ 1) = q(i), the new consumer opts for
network i, in which case next period's aftermarket state increases to i + 1.
Firm's pricing decision. Firm i's value function is given by
v(i) = q(i)
µ
p(i) + µ(i + 1) + ±
j
´



















where i = 0;:::;´ ¡ 1 and j = ´ ¡ 1 ¡ i.17 This is illustrated in Figure 2.
15. Recall that the argument of u includes the network adopter to whom the value
function applies, thus i must be strictly positive in order for the value function to
apply. For the extreme values i = 1 and i = ´, (4) calls for values of q(¢) and u(¢)
that are not de¯ned. However, these values are multiplied by zero.
16. Alternatively, I can consider a constant continuation utility upon death.
17. Again, notice that, for the extreme case i = 0, (5) calls for values of v(¢) which are
not de¯ned. However, these values are multiplied by zero.
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Figure 2: Firm's value function.
With probability q(i), ¯rm i attracts the new consumer and receives p(i).
This moves the aftermarket state to i+1, yielding a period payo® of µ(i+1);
following that, with probability (i+1)=´ network i loses a consumer, in which
case the state reverts back to i, whereas with probability j=´ network j loses
a consumer, in which case the state stays at i + 1. With probability q(j),
the rival ¯rm makes the current sale. Firm i gets no revenues in the primary
market. In the aftermarket, it gets µ(i) in the current period; following that,
with probability i=´ network i loses a consumer, in which case the state drops
to i ¡ 1, whereas with probability (j + 1)=´ network j loses a consumer, in
which case the state reverts back to i.
Equation (5), and the fact that q(i) depends on p(i) according to (3),





















































In order to understand the intuition for the ¯rst order condition (6), it may













where ² is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand (by a new-
born consumer). In other words, (7) is similar to the standard static pro¯t
maximization elasticity rule, with one di®erence: instead of the production
marginal cost, which for simplicity I assume is zero, we have a negative \cost"
of ¡w(i). The value w(i), is ¯rm i's incremental future value from winning
the current sale. By \future" I mean beginning with the current period's
aftermarket. In terms of current period's payo®, the di®erence comes to
µ(i + 1) ¡ µ(i). In terms of future payo®s, we have the di®erence in value
function between states i+1 and i (if consumer death takes place in network
j) or between states i and i¡1 (if consumer death takes place in network i).
With this comparison in mind, we can see that the ¯rst term on the
right-hand side of (6) roughly corresponds to the standard markup under
monopoly pricing. The only di®erence is that consumer demand includes the
endogenous value di®erence u(i + 1) ¡ u(j + 1): recall that the indi®erent
consumer \address" x(i) is given by x(i) = p(i) ¡ p(j) ¡ u(i + 1) + u(j + 1).
The ¯rst term thus re°ects the ¯rm's \harvesting" price incentives (i.e., the
lower the demand elasticity, the higher the price).
The second term re°ects the ¯rm's \investing" price incentives; that is,
the more a ¯rm has to gain, in terms of future payo®s, from making the
current sale, the lower price it will set. I will return to this in the next
section.
Finally, substituting (6) into (5) and simplifying, we get



























This system is de¯ned by a lower triangular matrix, and can thus be solved













i = 0;:::;´ ¡ 1. For i = 0, we obtain v(0) from r(0) and µ(0). Then the
value of v(1) is given by v(0) as well as r(1) and µ(1); and so forth.
Transition matrix and steady state distribution. Given the equi-
librium values of q(i), I can compute a Markov transition matrix M = m(i;k)
where m(i;k) is the probability of moving from state i to state k. For
0 < i < ´ ¡ 1, we have
















m(i;i + 1) =
´ ¡ 1 ¡ i
´
q(i)
Moreover, m(i;k) = 0 if k < i¡1 or k > i+1. Finally, the boundary values
are obtained as follows. For i = 0, I apply the general equations and add
the value obtained for m(0;¡1) to the value of m(0;0). For i = ´ ¡ 1, again
I apply the general equations and add the value obtained for m(´ ¡ 1;´) to
m(´ ¡ 1;´ ¡ 1). As a result, I get












1 ¡ q(´ ¡ 1)
¢




1 ¡ q(´ ¡ 1)
¢
14Table 2: Notation.
i Firm i's network size (also j)
´ Market size (number of consumers).
± Discount factor.
»i Consumers's idiosyncratic preference for ¯rm i.
©(»i) Distribution of »i.
µ(i) Firm's aftermarket pro¯t in state i.
¸(i) Consumer's aftermarket bene¯t in state i.
x(i) Indi®erent consumer's relative preference for ¯rm i.
p(i) Price in state i (for new consumer).
q(i) Probability of a sale in state i (to new consumer).
u(i) Individual consumer's value in state i.
v(i) Firm's value in state i.
m(i;j) Transition probability from state i to state j.
d(i) Stationary probability density of state i.
Given the assumption that ©(¢) has full support (part (iii) of Assump-
tion 1), q(i) 2 (0;1) 8i, that is, there are no corner solutions in the pricing
stage. It follows that the Markov process is ergodic and I can compute the
stationary distribution over states. This is given by the (transposed) vector
d that solves dM = d.18
A summary of the model's notation is given in Table 2. To help the
reader navigate through the extensive set of variables, I follow the rule of
using Greek letters to denote exogenous values and Roman letters to denote
endogenous values.
3 Results
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium of the model introduced in
the previous section. A preliminary question of interest is existence and
uniqueness. Once that is established, I will be interested in (a) the price
function, (b) the evolution of market shares, and (c) ¯rm pro¯ts.
18. This vector d can also be computed by repeatedly multiplying M by itself. That
is, limk!1 Mk is a matrix with d in every row.
15Regarding the price function, the main question of interest is whether,
under network e®ects, p(i) is increasing or decreasing. The answer is not
obvious. On the one hand, we might expect the large network to exploit
its consumers' greater willingness to pay and charge a higher price. On the
other hand, the large network may have more to lose from failing to sign up
a new consumer, and thus price more aggressively than the small network.
Regarding the evolution of market shares, I de¯ne two concepts: weak and
strong market dominance. We say there is weak market dominance when the
large network attracts a new consumer with higher probability than the small
network, that is, q(i) > q(j) if and only if i > j. Weak market dominance
does not imply that the large network tends to increase in size. In fact,
since the death rate is given by i=´, the large network loses a consumer
with greater probability than the small network. We then say there is strong
market dominance when the large network increases its size in expected value,
which happens if and only if q(i) > i=´. Since the large network's death rate
is greater than the small network's, strong market dominance implies weak
market dominance.19
Finally, regarding ¯rm pro¯ts, the questions of interest are whether ¯rm
value is increasing in network size; and whether ¯rm value and industry value
are increasing or decreasing with the degree of network e®ects.
To recap, the model consists essentially of four sets of equations: the
new consumer demand functions (3), the consumer value functions (4), the
¯rm price functions (6), and the ¯rm value functions (9). This system does
not have a general analytical solution. As a result, I follow a two-pronged
strategy. First, I derive analytical results (Propositions 1{5) for restricted
sets of parameter values, speci¯cally, low ´, low ±, and low Ã, where the latter
parameter measures the degree of network e®ects. Second, I compute the
19. Athey and Schmutzler (2001) also distinguish between weak and strong market
dominance. They propose an investment model of dynamic competition. In their
de¯nition, weak dominance means the leader invests more, whereas strong domi-
nance means the leader increases its lead in expected terms. Although the mapping
between my model and theirs is not exact, I believe my de¯nition is the natural
counterpart to theirs.
There is also an interesting parallel with the ¯rm growth literature. Gibrat's
law (growth rates are proportional to ¯rm size) implies that the relative size of ¯rms
remains constant; it thus marks the threshold for strong market dominance. The
threshold for weak market dominance, in turn, corresponds to Sutton's property
that each new business opportunity is captured by incumbent ¯rms with equal
probability. I am grateful to Stephen Davies for pointing this out to me.
16solution numerically and determine the extent to which the limited analytical
results extend to the rest of the parameter space.
Before getting into the main characterization results, I introduce three
lemmas which provide a partial characterization of uniqueness and the shape
of q(i) and p(i). These lemmas are useful in several ways. First, they help
understand the intuition for equilibrium dynamics. Second, they are used in
the proofs of propositions that will follow. Finally, the ¯rst lemma also forms
the basis for the Gaussian method used in numerical computations. The
lemmas (and the propositions that follow) make extensive use of di®erences
across players. Speci¯cally, I de¯ne
P(i) = p(i) ¡ p(j)
H(i) = h(i) ¡ h(j)
U(i) = u(i + 1) ¡ u(j + 1)
W(i) = w(i) ¡ w(j)
In words, a capital Roman letter variable denotes the di®erence between
player i's variable and player j's. The only exception to this rule, U(i), takes
into account the fact that, when a newborn consumer joins network i, that
network's size increases to i + 1.
Lemma 1 Given fU(i);W(i)g, there exist unique fp(i);q(i)g satisfying equi-
librium conditions (3) and (6); given fp(i);q(i)g, there exist unique fu(i);v(i)g
satisfying equilibrium conditions (4) and (9).
The proof of this and the following results may be found in the Appendix.
Notice that fU(i);W(i)g are uniquely determined by fu(i);v(i)g. There-
fore, a corollary of Lemma 1 is that, given fu(i);v(i)g, there exist unique
fp(i);q(i)g satisfying equilibrium conditions (3) and (6).20
While Lemma 1 does not prove equilibrium uniqueness, it shows how
uniqueness is obtained in my model when it is so di±cult to obtain it in
static models. Since consumers make their decisions in a staggered way (one
at a time), a \small" consumer essentially takes future value functions as
20. Caplin and Nalebu® (1991) prove equilibrium uniqueness (Proposition 6) for a
game similar to the static game obtained when ± = 0 or when fu(i);v(i)g are
given. Instead of my Assumption 1, they assume that Á is log-concave. Bagnoli
and Bergstrom (2005) establish that my assumption is weaker than Caplin and
Nalebu®'s (1991). (I am grateful to a referee for the latter reference.)
17given. This means the problem of ¯nding an equilibrium can be reduced to
the ¯rms' pricing and the newborn consumer's choice, which is essentially a
garden-variety discrete choice problem.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, the higher U(i)+W(i) is, the higher q(i) is. More-
over, q(i) ¸ 1
2 if and only if U(i) + W(i) ¸ 0.
Lemma 2 implies that q(i) > q(j) if and only if U(i) + W(i) > 0. We thus
have two sources of weak market dominance: U(i) and W(i). To the extent
that consumers derive greater utility from a larger network, U(i) > 0, which
in turn increases the likelihood a new consumer joins the larger network.
To the extent that a large network has more to gain from attracting a new
consumer than a small network, W(i) > 0. Since p(i) = h(i) ¡ w(i), the
larger network, having a higher w(i), prices more aggressively, which in turn
increases the likelihood a new consumer joins the larger network.
An alternative way to understand the e®ect of W(i) is to consider that,
if w(i) > w(j) when i > j, then industry continuation value is greater if
the larger network makes the sale. That is, if we let v+ and v¡ be con-
tinuation value with and without a sale, respectively, then w(i) > w(j) is
equivalent to v+(i) ¡ v¡(i) > v+(j) ¡ v¡(j), which in turn is equivalent to
v+(i) + v¡(j) > v¡(i) + v+(j). In related research, Budd, Harris and Vick-
ers (1993) and Cabral and Riordan (1994) also found that such joint-pro¯t
or joint-value e®ects lead to market dominance. Essentially, the joint-value
e®ect corresponds to the dynamic version of Gilbert and Newbery's (1982)
e±ciency e®ect, whereby a monopolist has more to lose from not acquiring
a new patent than a potential entrant has to gain from acquiring the same
new patent.
I should note that these results depend on the assumption that the outside
good is always dominated, that is, a newborn consumer always chooses one
of the networks. If the outside good is not dominated, then I would need
to consider a two-dimensional state space, keeping track of both i and j. In
economic terms, the no-outside-good assumption maximizes the preemption
motives by the large ¯rm. This is equivalent to the contrast between Gilbert
and Newbery's (1982) result on persistence of monopoly and Reinganum's
(1982) replacement counter-example.21
21. See Cabral (2000, Chapter 16) for a model that nests both Gilbert and Newbery
(1982) and Reinganum (1982).
18Lemma 3 For a given W(i), there exists a U0 such that P(i) > 0 if and
only if U(i) > U0. For a given U(i), there exists a W 0 such that P(i) < 0 if
and only if W(i) > W 0.
The values of U(i) and W(i) measure the two sources of pricing incentives.
To the extent that U(i) is positive, consumers place a premium on network
i. Everything else constant, this leads ¯rm i to set a higher price. We may
refer to this as the \harvesting" e®ect. But everything else is not constant. A
positive W(i) implies that ¯rm i has more at stake in terms of future value.
Everything else constant, this would lead ¯rm i to set a lower price. We may
refer to this as the \investment" e®ect.
We thus have a \race" between harvesting and investing. Lemma 3 pro-
vides a (partial) characterization of prices with reference to this \race." It
states that a larger network i will set a higher price than a smaller network if
and only if the harvesting e®ect, measured by U(i), is su±ciently large with
respect to the investment e®ect, measured by W(i).
Equipped with these three lemmas, I now set out to characterize the
solution for particular regions of the model's parameter set. I start with the
case of low ´.
Proposition 1 If ´ = 2, then there exists a unique equilibrium. Moreover,
if Properties 1 and 2 hold, then q(1) > q(0) and v(1) > v(0). Finally, there
exists a ¸0 such that p(1) > p(0) if and only if ¸(2) ¡ ¸(1) > ¸0.
In the particular case when ´ = 2, the values of U(i) and W(i) are completely
determined by the primitives ¸(i) and µ(i). The ¯rst part of Proposition
1 then follows from Lemma 1. Moreover, Properties 1 and 2 imply that
U(i) > 0 and W(i) > 0. The second part of Proposition 1 then follows from
Lemma 2 (q(1) > q(0)) and simple algebraic manipulations (v(1) > v(0)).
Finally, the result regarding prices follows from Lemma 3.
One question that might be asked about my framework is the role played
by consumer rational expectations. Many of the existing models of network
e®ects assume that consumers are short-lived, myopic, or naive. I de¯ne a
naive consumer as one who assumes that network size will remain at its cur-
rent level, that is, a consumer who fails to \solve" the model and correctly
predict the evolution of network size. Denote by a tilde equilibrium vari-
ables corresponding to the case of naive consumers. Beginning with value
functions, we have
~ u(i) = ¸(i) + ± ~ u(i) (11)
19In words, a consumer in a network of size i assumes that network size will
remain the same. There are other ways of modeling naivete, but this seems
a natural one.22
How do equilibrium values with naive consumers compare to the case of
rational, forward-looking consumers? The next result provides the answer:
Proposition 2 Suppose that Property 1 holds. If ´ = 2, then ~ q(0) < q(0)
and ~ v(0) < v(0).
Intuitively, a small network su®ers from consumer naivete because, in
expected value, its network size can only increase | but consumers don't
take that into account. For example, suppose that ©(x) is a standardized
Normal (consistent with Assumption 1); µ(0) = 0;µ(1) = 1
2;µ(2) = 2;¸(1) =
1
2;¸(2) = 1 (all consistent with Properties 1 and 2); and ± = :9. Then,
in the equilibrium with rational consumers we have q(0) ¼ :199, whereas
with naive consumer we obtain ~ q(0) ¼ :097; that is, the model with naive
consumers underestimates the probability of a sale by a small ¯rm by less
than one half. In terms of value, we have v(0) ¼ 7:96 and ~ v(0) ¼ 2:43; that
is, the model with naive consumers underestimates the value of a small ¯rm
by less than one third. Naturally, di®erent parameter values lead to di®erent
estimate errors. However, my various simulations suggest that the prediction
of Proposition 2 is not simply a theoretical possibility.
I next turn to the case when the discount factor, ±, is small. I show
uniqueness of equilibrium and characterize the price function (Proposition
3) as well as the evolution of market shares (Proposition 4).
Proposition 3 There exists a ±0 such that, if ± < ±0, then there exists a
unique equilibrium. Moreover, (a) if µ(i+1)¡µ(i) is constant and Property
1 holds strictly, then p(i) is strictly increasing; (b) if ¸(i) is constant and
Property 2 holds strictly, then p(i) is strictly decreasing.
Proposition 3 highlights the two main forces impacting on the ¯rms' pric-
ing incentives: market power over the current newborn consumer and the
quest for market power in the aftermarket and in future periods. Analyti-
cally, we have p(i) = h(i) ¡ w(i), where the right-hand side represents the
22. For example, I could assume that the consumer allows for the possibility that he
will die (which happens with probability 1=´). In that case, ± would be multiplied
by (´ ¡ 1)=´. The qualitative nature of Proposition 2 would remain valid.
20two e®ects on pricing. Proposition 3 considers the case when the discount
factor is small. In this case, most of the e®ects are re°ected in (current
period's) aftermarket payo®s, which in turn allows me to derive conditions
under which the ¯rst or the second e®ects dominate.
Speci¯cally, in case (a) aftermarket pro¯ts are an a±ne function of net-
work size. This implies that the bene¯t from winning a new customer, in
terms of aftermarket pro¯ts, does not depend on network size: w(i) is a
constant. Di®erences in pricing are thus exclusively driven by market power
considerations related to the newborn consumer, h(i). Now, consumers are
willing to pay more for a ¯rm with a bigger network. In equilibrium, this is
re°ected in a higher price by the ¯rm with a larger network. Thus p(i) is
increasing in i.
In case (b), consumers do not care about network size. (Notice this does
not mean there are no network externalities, rather that sellers completely
capture the added consumer surplus resulting from network externalities.) If
it were not for aftermarket and future pro¯ts, ¯rms would set the same price,
as their products are identical in the eyes of consumers. But to the extent
that w(i) ¼ µ(i) ¡ µ(i ¡ 1) is increasing, the ¯rm with a bigger network size
has more to gain from making the next sale. This implies that it discounts
price (with respect to the static price) to a greater extent. Thus p(i) is
decreasing in i.
Before presenting the next result, I de¯ne by i¤ ´
´¡1
2 the \symmetric"
state. If ´ is even, then there exists no symmetric state, but the result below
applies nonetheless.23
Proposition 4 Suppose that Properties 1 and 2 hold. There exist ±0; ¸0; µ0
such that, if ± < ±0, then: (a) q(i) ¸ 1
2 if and only if i > i¤; (b) If i is close to
zero or close to ´¡1, then the state moves toward i¤ in expected terms; (c) If i
is close to i¤, and either ¸(i¤+1)¡¸(i¤) > ¸0 or µ(i¤+1)+µ(i¤¡1)¡2µ(i¤) >
µ0, then the state moves away from i¤ in expected terms.
In other words, Proposition 4 states that, if ± is small, then weak market
dominance results. However, when market shares are close to zero or to
100%, the death rate of a large network exceeds its birth rate, resulting in
reversion to the mean (the opposite of strong market dominance). Around
23. Speci¯cally, if ´ is odd, then i¤ is the symmetric state. If ´ is even, then there is
no symmetric state; i¤ ¡ 1
2 and i¤ + 1
2 are the two states closest to symmetry.
21symmetric states, if either µ(i) is very convex or ¸(i) very steep, then strong
market dominance takes place.
To conclude the set of analytical results, I present a complete characteri-
zation of the equilibrium solution in the case when network e®ects are small,
linear, and accrue to consumers in the form of aftermarket bene¯ts.
Proposition 5 Suppose that ¸(i) = Ã i and µ(i) = 0. There exists a Ã0 such
that, if Ã < Ã0, then: (a) Prices are increasing in network size; (b) Larger
networks are more likely to attract a new consumer; (c) In expected terms,
larger networks decrease in size; (d) Firm value is increasing in network size;
(e) Industry pro¯ts are decreasing in the degree of network e®ects.
Parts (a), (b) and (c) of Proposition 5 are in line with Propositions 3
and 4. Parts (d) and (e) pertain to ¯rm value in equilibrium. Together,
they imply that, under network e®ects, having a larger network leads to
greater ¯rm value, but network e®ects uniformly decrease industry value.
This is reminiscent of Theorem 3.5 in Cabral and Riordan's (1994) model of
learning-by-doing. They show that, in equilibrium, industry value is lower
than it would be in an environment where no learning-by-doing took place. In
other words, while learning-by-doing and network e®ects increase total social
value, they decrease total industry value.24 Notice that this result depends
importantly on my assumption that there is no outside good (or equivalently
that it is always dominated by the network goods). If there is a (relevant)
outside good then network e®ects, by increasing the value of both network
goods, are likely to imply an expansion in total market size, in which case
industry value is more likely to increase.
Numerical simulations. My theoretical results apply to extreme val-
ues of key parameter values (´;±;Á). In order to explore what happens for
other parameter values, I performed a series of additional simulations. A de-
tailed description of these simulations is available in an online appendix. The
numerical results largely con¯rm the patterns described in the above analyt-
ical results, thus suggesting the latter do not depend on speci¯c parameter
values.
The numerical results also suggest patterns that are not obtained in the
analytical results. Consider ¯rst the price function. At a theoretical level,
24. See Cabral and Villas-Boas (2005) for a generalization of this idea.
22I showed that there is a \race" between two e®ects, harvesting and invest-
ing. Numerical simulations show that, when after-market bene¯ts accrue
primarily to consumers, then we obtain an increasing price function (har-
vesting e®ect dominates); if, however, after-market bene¯ts accrue primarily
to ¯rms, then we obtain a decreasing price function (investment e®ect dom-
inates), unless ± is high and market share is high, in which case the price
function is again positively sloped. Overall, these results are consistent with
Proposition 3 (except for the case when ± is high).
Regarding market dominance, all numerical simulations con¯rm that q(i)
is increasing, thus extending the prediction of Propositions 1 and 4. More-
over, if network bene¯ts are su±ciently strong, then strong market domi-
nance takes place. Again, this is consistent with, and extends, the prediction
of Propositions 1 and 4. Finally, one result that I do not derive analytically
but is rather salient in the numerical simulations is that, as ® changes from
0 to 1, there is a shift towards greater market dominance.
4 Application: wireless telecommunications
In this section, I consider the application of my general framework to the
study of wireless telecommunications. The application consists of adapting
the static model of La®ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,b) (hereafter LRT) to
produce speci¯c functional forms µ(i), ¸(i). I then use the dynamic model
developed in the previous sections to study the e®ects of regulatory policy
regarding termination charges (also known as access charges).
In most developed countries, direct network e®ects play a relatively small
role in telecommunications: by means of interconnection agreements, all
callers are able to communicate with all other callers. However, if calls are
priced di®erently depending on the calling parties' networks (typically with
o®-net calls being more expensive than on-net calls) then we have what LRT
refer to as tari®-mediated network externalities (or network e®ects).
I assume that (as is the case in Europe) termination charges are set by
regulators, and examine the implications of alternative policies. I show that,
in addition to the immediate (or static) e®ect, one must also consider how
di®erent levels of termination charges lead to di®erent dynamic paths of
network market structure. Speci¯cally, I show that higher markups over
marginal cost, in addition to the short run deadweight loss characterized by
LRT, imply a higher degree of market dominance, that is, a greater tendency
23for larger networks to become even larger.
Model. Figure 3 illustrates the game played between networks in the
aftermarket. This ¯gure is essentially identical to Figure 1 in LRT, though
the notation is slightly di®erent. Each network sets the prices of on-net calls
and o®-net calls. For example, if A calls B, who is in the same network, then
A is charged ~ p(i), the on-net call price for network i. If however A calls C,
who is in a di®erent network, then A is charged ^ p(i), the o®-net call price for
network i. (I assume the receiving party is never charged.)
The main di®erence of my application with respect to LRT is that they
assume all consumers simultaneous choose which network to join and how
many calls to make. By contrast, I assume that, in each period, the size of
each network is given. Only the newborn consumer decides which network
it wants to join. All other consumers simply decide how many calls to make
(given the network they belong to).25
In terms of costs, I follow LRT in assuming that the social cost of a call
is given by c0 + c1 + c0, where c0 is the cost at each end of the call and c1 is
the trunk cost. Notice that cost is the same regardless of whether the call is
on-net or o®-net. In other words, like LRT I assume there are no \physical"
bene¯ts from network size.
For on-net calls (say, from A to B), the cost c0+c1+c0 is all borne by the
network in question. For o®-net calls (say, from A to C), the calling network
(i, in this case) pays the cost c0+c1, corresponding to one end of the call and
the trunk cost, plus the termination charge a(j) which network j requires for
the service of terminating the call.










where qC is the quantity of calls (or number of minutes) between the two
users. In the appendix, I show this leads to the following consumer and ¯rm
aftermarket payo® functions:
25. Another di®erence with respect to LRT is that they consider both the case of linear
prices (as I do) and two part tari®s.
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Figure 3: On-net and o®-net calls.
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Access charge and short-run pro¯ts. I now use my model to con-
sider the static and dynamic implications of di®erent values of the access
charge a(i) paid by network j to network i. I consider three possible cases:
(A) Access charges are regulated at marginal cost level: a(i) = c0.
(B) Access charges are set at twice marginal cost level: a(i) = 2c0.








In a certain sense, case C is a combination of cases A and B: a network of
size zero charges 2c0 (as in case B), whereas a network of size ´ charges c0






i . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .







. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .
Figure 4: Firm pro¯t and consumer surplus, under cases A (solid line), B
(dashed line), and C (dotted line).
The above cases, while obviously very stylized, roughly re°ect the policies
of various European regulators in recent years. In particular, the consensus
has been to converge to case A from the scenarios of recent years, which have
been closer to B or C.
Figure 4 depicts ¯rm pro¯t and consumer surplus in the aftermarket as a
function of market share.26 Consider ¯rst the left panel, ¯rm pro¯t. If access
charges are set at marginal cost level (solid lines), then on-net and o®-net calls
cost the same. As a result, a ¯rm's pro¯t per period is simply proportional
to its market share. If however ¯rms set a ¯xed markup over cost, as in
case B (dashed lines), then we have a situation of double marginalization
(also characterized by LRT). This implies equilibrium pro¯ts below the case
when access charges are set at marginal cost level.27 Finally, in case C, the
pro¯t function µ(i), while still increasing, is now concave for low values of i
(thus violating Property 2) and convex for high values of i. Moreover, for
low values of i, µ(i) is greatest in case C: in terms of current pro¯ts, small
networks prefer asymmetric regulation, whereby they are able to charge a
high termination charge while the rival (large) network is forced to charge a
low one.
Consider now the right panel, which depicts consumer surplus as a func-
26. In all of the simulations presented in this section, I assume ± = :9, c0 = c1 = 1,
! = 5. Di®erent parameter values lead to equivalent qualitative results.
27. Notice we are considering the case when both ¯rms charge an access fee above cost.
Given ¯rm j's access fee, ¯rm i is better o® by charging an access fee above cost.
In other words, the one-shot game of setting access fees is a prisoner's dilemma:
¯rms are better o® with marginal cost pricing, but each ¯rm has an incentive to
set fees above marginal cost.
26tion of network size. Under marginal cost pricing (solid lines), consumer
surplus is independent of network size: to the extent that on-net and o®-net
prices are the same, consumers do not care about the size of their network.
Consider now case B, when termination charges are constant but greater
than marginal cost. This leads networks to set higher o®-net call prices than
on-net call prices. As a result, consumer surplus is (linearly) increasing in
i. Finally, consider case C. If network size is either equal to zero or to ´,
then consumer surplus is the same as under marginal cost pricing. If i = 0,
the rival network charges a termination charge that is equal to marginal cost
and so, from a consumer's perspective, it is as if we were in case A. If i = ´,
then consumers do not care about access charges as none of their calls will
be o®-net anyway. For intermediate values of i, we observe that asymmetric
regulation of termination charges may lead to a non-monotonic consumer
surplus function (thus violating Property 1).
To summarize, setting termination charges above marginal cost implies
a short-run economic loss which generally leads to a loss in ¯rm pro¯ts and
consumer surplus. Under asymmetric regulation, however, small networks
are better o®. Finally, notice that, while Properties 1 and 2 hold in cases A
and B, they both fail in case C.
Access charge and dynamic equilibrium. The short-run implica-
tions of markups in access charges are well known from LRT and other papers.
My main point in the present application is that di®erent regulatory regimes
also have important dynamic implications. This is illustrated in Figure 5,
where I plot the values of of various endogenous variables under each of the
three scenarios I have been considering.
Consider ¯rst the top left-hand panel, p(i), which depicts the price paid
by a newborn consumer in order to join a network of size i. Under marginal
cost access pricing, this price is independent of network size. In fact, to
the extent that pro¯ts are proportional to market share, a ¯rm's incentive
to attract a new consumer is independent of its network size; and moreover
consumer do not care about network size either. If however a(i) = ¹ a > c0,
then two things happen: First, consumers are more willing to join a larger
network (everything else constant). Second, ¯rm i's payo® per period is a
convex function of its market share. Together, these facts lead to a U shaped
price function: for low values of i, the investment price incentive is very low
(given convexity of the v(i)), leading to high prices; whereas for high values of
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Figure 5: Representative results of access charge regulation simulations:
Cases A (solid line), B (dashed line), and C (dotted line).
28high prices. (Strategic complementarity between ¯rm prices is also a factor
here.) This is broadly consistent with the analytical and numerical results
presented in Section 3.
Finally, consider the case of asymmetric regulation. As mentioned earlier,
this case implies that the derivative of ¯rm pro¯t with respect to network size
is very large either for very low or for very high i. The pattern of the short
run µ(i) function is re°ected in the value function v(i), as can be seen from
the second right-hand panel. This leads ¯rms to compete very aggressively
for new consumers when market shares are very asymmetric. As a result,
the pricing function has an inverted-U shape. This is very di®erent from the
results obtained in Section 3, but recall that then I assumed Properties 1 and
2 held, whereas under case C these properties are violated.
Consider now the top right-hand panel, q(i). Under marginal cost termi-
nation charges, consumers are indi®erent regarding network size. This leads
to a constant 50% probability of joining network i. Under a constant markup,
however, larger networks become more attractive to consumers. Consistently
with the results in Section 3, this leads to an increasing q(i) function. In
fact, if the markup over marginal costs is su±ciently high (as is the case
with a(i) = 2c0), then the slope of q(i) is greater than 1=´ at i = ´=2. Fi-
nally, under scenario C we obtain a non-monotonic q(i) mapping. This is
di®erent from the theoretical results in Section 3, where I assume Properties
1 and 2 hold. These properties are violated under Scenario 3. In particular,
consumer bene¯t is decreasing in network size for small i.
Di®erent mappings q(i) lead to di®erent stationary distributions over mar-
ket shares. Under Scenarios A and C, the birthrate q(i) is greater than the
death rate if and only if i < ´=2. As a result, the dynamics are characterized
by reversion to the mean and the stationary distribution of markets shares
in unimodal. Under Scenario B, for intermediate values of i the birth rate is
greater than the death rate if and only if i > ´=2. As a result, the dynam-
ics are characterized by strong market dominance. This is illustrated in the
third right-hand panel of Figure 5, d(i).
The two bottom panels illustrate the dynamics implied by the stationary
distributions. The bottom left panel simulates Scenarios A and B for 1000
periods (Scenario C implies a similar pattern to Scenario A). Starting from
the symmetric state, i = i¤ = 50, the system remains around i¤ most of the
time under Scenario A but rapidly converges to one of the asymmetric states
under Scenario B (i = 18 in the particular example). Under Scenario B, the
system hovers around the asymmetric state for a \long" time. However, if we
29simulate the system for long enough, then \tipping" takes place, that is, the
system moves across asymmetric states. This is illustrated by the bottom
right panel, where I simulate the system under Scenario B for one million
periods instead of one thousand.
I next turn to pro¯ts and welfare. The third left panel from the top,
sw(i) shows that social welfare is lower the higher the markup of termina-
tion charges over marginal cost: lowest in Case B, highest in Case A. Not
surprisingly, the welfare loss is greater at intermediate states. In fact, at
i = 0 there are no o®-net calls, and so all cases lead to the same level of
social welfare. Notice that the panel only gives welfare as a function of the
state. Average long-run welfare is then given by the \integral" of the sw(i)
mapping weighted by the stationary distribution over states. This distinction
is important. For example, the simple average di®erence between Scenarios
B and C, in terms of social welfare, is favorable to the latter by about 5.65%.
However, when weighted by long-run probabilities, it is considerably lower,
2.57%. In fact, it is theoretically conceivable that the two averages have
di®erent sign.
While social welfare is uniformly lower with termination charges markups,
the di®erent policies also have signi¯cant distributional implications (con-
sumers vs ¯rms). This is illustrated by the second row of panels in Figure 5.
The left panel, cw(i), shows that for i close to zero (or close to ´) consumers
are better o® under scenario C. This is because ¯rms compete vigorously for a
new consumer; and, from the point of view of termination charges, consumers
are nearly indi®erent because there are very few o®-net calls (i ¼ ´) or the
rival network charges access rates close to marginal cost (i ¼ 0). However,
notice that, in the long run, these states are visited very infrequently.
From the right-hand panel, v(i), we see that there is a range of low values
of i such that a ¯rm is better o® under Scenario C than Scenario A. It should
be noted, however, that v(0) is actually lower under Scenario C than under
Scenario A. The di®erence is small and can hardly be noticed in Figure 5,
but the idea should be clear. From a short-run aftermarket pro¯t point
of view, Scenarios A and C are not very di®erent: a small network cares
little about charging high termination charges since there are very few calls
to terminate. However, Scenario C has an immediate negative e®ect: it
increases competition for new customers, as shown in the top left panel. In
addition to Scenario C, ¯rm value at i = 0 is also lower under Scenario B
than under Scenario A.
30Policy implications: protecting entrants. One of the salient fea-
tures of my dynamic framework is that markups in access charges decrease
the value of a ¯rm with zero network (an \entrant"). This holds true re-
gardless of whether termination charges are symmetric or asymmetric. My
conclusion for the symmetric case is consistent with various static models,
including those by Calzada and Valletti (2007) and Hoernig (2007). Peitz
(2005), who considers a static model of network competition, shows that the
small network's pro¯t increases if the regulator sets a higher price to access
the small network (asymmetric termination charge regulation). Consistently
with his conclusion, my model predicts that the small network's pro¯t in the
after market is greater under asymmetric regulation. However, di®erently
from the static model, the small network's value is lower under asymmetric
regulation, because of increased competition for new consumers.
The discussion of the merits of asymmetric termination charge regulation
is not of purely academic interest. Consider for example the following quote
from a recent Common Position by the European Regulation Group (ERG):
Under some circumstances asymmetric mobile termi-
nation rates may be justi¯ed for example ... to en-
courage the growth of a new entrant on the market,
which su®ers from a lack of scale due to late market
entry (European Regulation Group, 2008, p. 82)
In its contribution to the ERG consultation, and referring to asymmetric ter-
mination charge regulation, telecommunications operator Vodafone a±rmed
that
Asymmetries for `late entrants' are entirely subjective
and have no justi¯cation at all. Worse, they discour-
age later entrants from growing. (Vodafone, 2008, p.
2)
My analysis suggests that, di®erently from the ERG's claim, it is not nec-
essarily the case that asymmetric regulation increases short-run pro¯ts of
small operators or strengthens their relative competitive position (unless we
interpret the latter as fast market share growth). Moreover, while my anal-
ysis agrees with Vodafone that asymmetric regulation may not help small
operators, the reason is rather di®erent: the value upon entry is lower, but
conditional on entry growth takes place faster (because small operators have
so much to gain from increasing market share).
31Admittedly, my model is very stylized; for example, I only consider two
operators. However, it suggests that competition dynamics leads to a variety
of e®ects that a static analysis may miss.
Summary. There is now an extensive literature dealing with the prob-
lem of wireless network competition and regulation of termination charges.28
To the best of my knowledge, all of the models developed are static in na-
ture. The model I present in this section, in addition to illustrating my
general framework, contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I
show that, in addition to the static e±ciency e®ects of di®erent regulation
modes, one must also consider the dynamic market share e®ects. Speci¯cally,
higher termination charges, by inducing tari® mediated network e®ects, lead
to more dispersed market shares, possibly a bi-modal stationary distribu-
tion. Second, allowing small networks to charge higher termination charges,
while increasing their short-run pro¯ts, may actually lead to lower ¯rm value
because of the more aggressive behavior by the large \incumbent" network.
5 Final remarks
In this paper, I propose a novel framework with which to analyze the dynam-
ics of price competition with network e®ects. I provide a series of analytical
results which characterize equilibrium dynamics: conditions for equilibrium
existence and uniqueness; conditions such that the price function is increas-
ing (larger ¯rms set higher prices); and conditions such that market share
dynamics are characterized by weak or strong market dominance. The nu-
merical solution of the model suggests that the properties uncovered for ex-
treme parameter values (low ´, low ±, low Ã) largely extend to other regions
of the parameter space.
I then apply my framework to the study of termination charges (or access
charges) in wireless telecommunications. I do so by embedding the La®ont,
Rey and Tirole (1998a,b) model of competition between networks into my
dynamic framework. I consider various forms of termination charge regu-
lation and solve for the resulting equilibrium. The results suggest that, in
addition to the static e®ects uncovered in previous research, there are inter-
esting dynamic e®ects resulting from di®erent regulatory regimes. For exam-
ple, high markups of termination charges over marginal cost imply greater
28. For a survey, see Harbord and Pagnozzi (2008).
32market dominance, and possibly the switch from a uni-modal to a bi-modal
stationary distribution of market shares.
There are other interesting issues that one can analyze with the framework
presented in this paper. One is to estimate the barrier to entry created by
network e®ects: how does the value of a new entrant depend on the degree
of network e®ects? A second issue is innovation incentives under network
e®ects: do larger networks have a greater incentive to improve their product
than smaller networks?29
29. In order to answer this question, one would need to extend the present framework
to the case of asymmetric ¯rms. This is notationally painful; and increases the
state space from ´=2 to ´ states; but otherwise it is feasible.
33Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Subtracting the ¯rst-order conditions, I have
P(i) = H(i) ¡ W(i): (12)


























since x(j) = ¡x(i), ©(¡x) = 1 ¡ ©(x) and Á(¡x) = Á(x). Given that










¢ = ¡W(i) (13)
Given U(i) and W(i), the above equation has only one unknown, P(i).










Part (iv) of Assumption 1 then implies that the left-hand side of (14) is
increasing in x. It follows that, given U(i), the left-hand side of (13) is an
increasing function of P(i), ranging from ¡1 to +1. The intermediate value
theorem implies that there exists a unique equilibrium value P(i). Given
fP(i)g (as well as fU(i)g), the values of q(i) and p(i) are uniquely determined
by (3) and (6). (By fP(i)g I mean the set of values P(i) for all i.)
The reverse is straightforward. In fact, for given fp(i)g and fq(i)g, (4)
de¯nes a linear system in fu(i)g; and (9) de¯nes a linear system in fv(i)g;
and fU(i)g and fW(i)g are uniquely determined by fu(i)g and fv(i)g.
Proof of Lemma 2: Equation (12) may be re-written as


















34since x(i) = P(i) ¡ U(i).30
The left-hand side is increasing in x(i) and is equal to zero if x(i) = 0.
It follows that x(i) is decreasing in U(i) + W(i) and x(i) · 0 if and only
if U(i) + W(i) ¸ 0. Finally, the result follows from the equation for q(i),


























is an increasing function of P(i). It follows that P(i) > 0 if and only if
G(0) < ¡W(i). Since




















where I use the facts, implied by part (ii) of Assumption 1, that ©(¡x) =
1 ¡ ©(x) and Á(¡x) = ¡Á(x). Since the left-hand side is increasing in U(i),
the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1: If ´ = 2, then the consumer value functions (4)
become












30. I am grateful to a referee for suggesting this approach.
35It follows that U(1) = ¸(2) ¡ ¸(1) is a constant (and so is U(0) = ¡U(1)).
The ¯rm value functions (7) become












It follows that W(1) = µ(2) ¡ 2µ(1) + µ(0) is a constant (and so is W(0) =
¡W(1)).
Since fU(i);W(i)g and all constants, Lemma 1 implies that there exist
unique fp(i);q(i)g, satisfying the equilibrium conditions; and fu(i);v(i)g are
also uniquely determined by the equilibrium conditions. Moreover, Proper-
ties 1 and 2 imply that U(1) + W(1) > 0, which in turn implies q(1) > q(0),
by Lemma 2.
If ´ = 2, then the value functions (8) become
v(0) = r(0) + µ(0) + ± v(0)









Subtracting the ¯rst equation from the second one, we get














Since q(1) > q(0), we have r(1) > r(0). Property 2 implies µ(1) > µ(0). It
follows that v(1) > v(0).
Finally, the result regarding prices follows from Lemma 3 and the fact
that U(1) = ¸(2) ¡ ¸(1) and W(1) is a constant.
Proof of Proposition 2: First notice that uniqueness of equilibrium follows
by the same argument as when consumers are rational. From the proof of
Proposition 1, we know that U(1) = ¸(2)¡¸(1). Property 1 implies U(1) > 0.
From (11), we have ~ u(i) = (1 ¡ ±)¡1¸(i), and thus




= (1 ¡ ±)
¡1 U(1) > U(1)
Lemma 2 implies ~ q(1) > q(1). From (9) and ´ = 2, we have v(0) =
(1 ¡ ±)¡1 ¡
r(0) + µ(0)
¢
. Lemma 2 implies ~ v(0) < v(0).
36Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that ± = 0. Then
U(i) = ¸(i) ¡ ¸(j)
W(i) =
¡




µ(j + 1) ¡ µ(j)
¢ (15)
that is, fU(i);W(i)g are all constants. Lemma 1 then implies that there
exists a unique solution to the equilibrium system. This proves equilibrium
uniqueness for ± = 0.
By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2, there exists a ¯nite
¹ p such that, if p(i) = 2 [¡¹ p; ¹ p], then the equilibrium equations fail to hold by
an amount ² that is bounded away from zero. By continuity, if ± is in the
neighborhood of ± = 0 there can be no solution to the system of equilibrium
equations outside of [¡¹ p; ¹ p]. I thus henceforth restrict to this compact set of
p(i) values.
Consider the system of equations producing the equilibrium. This is given
by the price equations (6), the quantity equations (3), the consumer value
functions (4), and the ¯rm value functions (9). Let
x ´ (p(0);:::;p(´ ¡ 1);q(0);:::;q(´ ¡ 1);u(1);:::;u(´);v(0);:::;v(´ ¡ 1))
be the corresponding vector of equilibrium variables. We thus have a system
of 4´ equations and 4´ unknowns. Represent this system as fi(x;±) = 0.







I I 0 0
A I B 0
0 0 I 0






where A and B have non-zero values in both diagonals and zero in every
other position. It follows that 5f has full rank. Since moreover all fi are
continuously di®erentiable, the Implicit Function Theorem implies that there
exists a unique equilibrium in the neighborhood of x¤ and ± = 0, where x¤
is the equilibrium at ± = 0. Finally, by continuity and the assumption
that prices belong to a compact set, there exists no equilibrium outside the
neighborhood of x¤, which ¯nally implies there exists a unique equilibrium in
the neighborhood of ± = 0. This establishes the ¯rst part of the proposition.
I next turn to the equilibrium characterization. Consider ¯rst the case
when µ(i + 1) ¡ µ(i) is constant and Property 1 holds. If ± = 0, then w(i) =
37µ(i + 1) ¡ µ(i). It follows that w(i) is constant and thus W(i) = 0. Since
¸(i) > ¸(i¡1), it follows that U(i) = U(i)+W(i) is strictly increasing, which
by Lemma 2 implies that x(i) is strictly decreasing. Finally, since w(i) = µ1,










which, by part (iv) of Assumption 1, implies that p(i) is strictly increasing
in i.
Consider now the case when ¸(i) is constant and Property 2 holds. If
± = 0, then this implies that u(i) = ¸(i + 1) is constant, and thus U(i) = 0.
De¯ne H0(i) ´ @ H(i)= @ x(i). Note that, by part (iv) of Assumption 1,
H0(i) < 0; and that @ H(i)= @ P(i) = H0(i). Applying the Implicit Function





























































¡ 1 < 0:
If ± = 0, then w(i) = µ(i + 1) ¡ µ(i), which is strictly increasing. It follows
that p(i) is strictly decreasing in i. Finally, the results follow from continuity
38in ±.
Proof of Proposition 4: Equations (15) and Properties 1{2 imply that
U(i) ¸ 0 if and only if i ¸ i¤, and likewise W(i) > 0 if and only if i ¸ i¤.
Lemma 2 then implies that q(i) ¸ 1
2 if and only if i ¸ i¤.
Suppose that i¤ < i < ´ ¡ 1. From (10), the state moves away from i¤ in
expected terms if and only if














In other words, the system moves away from i¤ if and only if the leader's
birth rate, q(i), is greater that the leader's death rate, i
´¡1.
By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3, at ± = 0 and in
the neighborhood of ± = 0 equilibrium prices are ¯nite. This implies that
x(i) is bounded. Part (iii) of Assumption 1 then implies that q(i) is bounded
away from 1. Therefore, at i = ´ ¡ 1, q(i) < i
´¡1. Part (b) of the result
follows.
Suppose now that ¸(i¤+1)¡¸(i¤) > ¸0 > 0 or µ(i¤+1)+µ(i¤¡1)¡2µ(i¤) >
µ0 > 0. Note that, by Property 1, the ¯rst inequality implies U(i) > 0 for
all i > i¤; and, by Property 2, the second equality implies W(i) > 0 for all
i > i¤. By making ¸0 or µ0 large enough, I can make U(i) + W(i) arbitrarily
large. By Lemma 2, this implies I can make q(i) arbitrarily close to 1. The
death rate, by contrast, is close to 1
2. It follows that, for i close to i¤, (16)
holds true. Part (c) of the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let ^ y be the derivative of a generic variable
y with respect to Ã measured at Ã = 0. Note that, at Ã = 0, we have
39q(i) = ¹ q = 1
2 and u(i) = ¹ u. Therefore, by di®erentiating (4), we get





















































^ u(i + 2) +
´ ¡ 1
´











^ u(i + 2) +
´ ¡ 1
´





Subtracting by the corresponding expression for j, we have













^ U(i ¡ 1)
¶
This system has an exact linear solution:
^ U(i) = ´
2Ã i ¡ (´ ¡ 1)Ã
´ (1 ¡ ±) + 2±
Since µ(i) = 0, the ¯rm value function is given by


















Taking into account that, at Ã = 0, q(i) = ¹ q = 1






¢¡ ^ P(i) ¡ ^ U(i)
¢
Á(0)
Á(0)2 = ^ U(i) ¡ ^ P(i)
40Taking derivatives of (17) with respect to Ã at Ã = 0, we get







^ v(i ¡ 1)
¶
Since j = ´ ¡ 1 ¡ i, this can be rearranged as




^ v(i) ¡ ^ v(i ¡ 1)
¢
Likewise, for ¯rm j,




^ v(j) ¡ ^ v(j ¡ 1)
¢
















^ v(j) ¡ ^ v(j ¡ 1)
¢
(18)
which has a linear solution (notice that a linear ^ v implies that both the
left-hand side and the right-hand side are constant in i;j).
The price equation is given by





















Taking into account that, at Ã = 0, q(i) = ¹ q = 1




¡ ^ P(i) ¡ ^ U(i)
¢
Á(0)
Á(0)2 = ^ U(i) ¡ ^ P(i)
Taking derivatives of (19) with respect to Ã at Ã = 0, we get










^ v(i) ¡ ^ v(i ¡ 1)
¢
;
41Subtracting the ^ p(j) equation from the ^ p(i) equation, and taking into account
that ^ v(i) is linear, we have










^ U(i) ¡ ·;
where · is a constant (since v(i) is linear and i + j = ´ ¡ 1). Since ^ U(i) is
increasing, it follows that ^ p(i) is increasing. This in turn implies part (a) of
the proposition.
Since




it follows, by (20), that
^ q(i) = ¡Á(0)
³






Since ^ U(i) is increasing, so is ^ q(i), which proves part (b) of the proposition.
Part (c) is fairly straightforward: since Ã is small, q(i), the birth rate, is
approximately constant. The death rate, however, is given by i=´.
Plugging (20) into the value function, we get
(1 ¡ ±) ^ v(i) =
1
3




^ v(i) ¡ ^ v(i ¡ 1)
¢
(21)
Since ^ v is linear and U is increasing, the right-hand side is increasing in i.
It follows that ^ v is also increasing, which in turn implies part (d) of the
proposition.
Finally, the fact that v is increasing implies that the left-hand side of (18)
is negative, which in turn implies part (e) of the proposition.
Derivation of µ(i) and ¸(i) in wireless telecommunications exam-









42This leads to a demand curve qC = ! ¡ pC. Firm pro¯t (for a pair of users)
is given by
¼ = (pC ¡ c)qC = (! ¡ qC ¡ c)qC (23)













Substituting (24) for qC in (22) and (23), and subtracting expenditure from

















I now apply these generic expressions to the particular values of cost of on-
net and o®-net calls. Speci¯cally, pro¯t per on-net caller pair and pro¯t per
o®-net caller pair are respectively given by
~ ¼(i) =
µ










Finally, the number of o®-net calls originating in network j, per caller pair,
is given by
^ qC(j) =
! ¡ c0 ¡ c1 ¡ a(i)
2
:
Pulling all of these expressions together, I get the following equilibrium pro¯t
function:




= i(i ¡ 1)
µ

















43The ¯rst term corresponds to calls from a consumer to the other consumers
in the same network. The second term corresponds to calls from a consumer
to consumers in the other network. Finally, the third term corresponds to
revenues from charging termination fees to the other network.
As to the consumer net utility function, we have











! ¡ c0 ¡ c1 ¡ a(j)
2
¶2
Again, the ¯rst term corresponds to on-net calls and the second one to o®-net
calls. Notice that, if a(j) > c0, then the coe±cient on (i ¡ 1) is greater than
the coe±cient on j. It follows that ¸(i) is strictly increasing in i, that is,
Property 1 holds.
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